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Abstract 
 
This study examines the inter-industry wage structure of the organised manufacturing 
sector in India for the period 1973-74 to 2003-04 by estimating the growth of average 
real wages for production workers by industry. In order to estimate the growth rates, the 
study adopts a methodological framework that differs from other studies in that the time 
series properties of the concerned variables are closely considered in order to obtain 
meaningful estimates of growth that are unbiased and (asymptotically) efficient. Using 
wage data on 51 manufacturing industries at three digit level of the National Industrial 
Classification 1998 (India), our estimation procedure obtains estimates of growth of real 
wages per worker that are deterministic in nature by accounting for any potential 
structural break(s). Our findings show that the inter-industry wage structure in India has 
changed a lot in the period 1973-74 to 2003-04 and that it provides some evidence that 
the inter-industry wage differences have become more pronounced in the post-reforms 
period. Thus this paper provides new evidence from India on the need to consider the 
hypothesis that industry affiliation is potentially an important determinant of wages when 
studying any relationship between reforms and wages. 
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1. Introduction 
Common to most other developing countries, the Indian economy has undergone 
rapid trade liberalisation and industrial deregulation in the 1990s. Despite a considerable 
debate on the impact of these reforms on the Indian economy, little systematic empirical 
work has examined the effects of these reforms on industry wages. This paper is a part of 
an ongoing study of the changing wage structure of the organised manufacturing sector in 
India and presents new evidence on inter-industry wage differentials. 
The modest but growing literature in this field has mainly focused on the relation 
between trade reforms and relative industry wages by empirically exploring different 
theoretical channels through which trade liberalisation affect wages. The general trend in 
the literature on India has been to investigate the determinants of wages and their 
implications on wage inequality. Two topical studies that deserve mention are by Goldar 
(2002) and Tendulkar (2003) both of which are mainly concerned with the estimation of 
wage, labour productivity and employment growth in the pre- and post- reforms period. 
Both of these studies examine the trends in employment and wages and their linkage with 
productivity for the Indian manufacturing sector. Similarly, Dutt (2003) and Goldar 
(2003), who examined the effect of trade protection on average industry product wage1, 
did not find any significant relationship between trade and wage growth.  On a different 
side, Banga (2005) examines the impact of FDI, trade and technology on wages and 
employment, using dynamic panel methods, thereby showing that FDI, trade and 
technological progress have differential impact on wages and employment. On the other 
hand, Topalova (2006) explores the causal link between liberalisation and changes in 
poverty and income inequality by exploiting the variation in the timing and degree of 
liberalisation across industries, and in the variation in the location of the industries in 
districts throughout India. He finds that rural areas, with high concentration of industries 
that were disproportionately affected by tariff reductions, experienced slower progress in 
poverty reductions. However, for these areas, there was no discernible effect on 
inequality. Another important issue that the literature has very commonly addressed is the 
issue of the changing gap in wages between the skilled and unskilled workers in the 
backdrop of the reforms. In this spirit, Banga (2005b) uses cross- industry panel data 
estimations to show that wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in India 
                                                 
1 The product wage is the cost of hiring workers faced by the employer as opposed to the wage that workers 
actually receive. 
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has increased during the period 1991-92 to 1996-97. On a similar front, Chamarbagwala 
(2006) uses a non-parametric methodology to investigate the widening skill wage gap and 
the narrowing gender-wage differential in India in the 1980s and the 1990s. Her findings 
show that external sector reforms leading to increase in trade in manufactures benefited 
skilled men but hurt skilled women, whereas outsourcing of services benefited both 
skilled men and women. Similarly, Sen (2009) presents evidence of a widening wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled workers, and an increase in relative skill intensity in Indian 
manufacturing, which he shows to be the direct and indirect effects of the trade reforms.  
The above discussion shows that in spite of a modest and growing literature there 
hasn’t been any attempt to explore the inter-industry wage structure in India. The present 
study contributes to the literature by estimating the growth rates in average real wages for 
production workers by industry and examining whether there is any evidence of changing 
inter-industry wage inequality in the organised manufacturing sector in India. The 
motivation behind this exercise is the growing body of research that suggests that the 
industry affiliation of worker’s is an important determinant of wage as a result of which 
there might be substantial differences in wages between similar type of workers but 
employed in different type of industries. Krueger & Summers (1987) point out that this is 
the case either because of returns to industry-specific skills that cannot be transferred in 
the short- to medium- run or because of industry rents arising out of imperfect 
competition. This suggests the possibility of similar types of workers being paid different 
wages in different industries. If this is really the case then it means that if there are some 
industries that remain low paying throughout then, workers stuck in such low paying 
industries will never be able to have higher pay, unless there is perfect mobility of 
workers across industries and geographical locations. And this becomes particularly 
serious in the backdrop of some evidence that labour reallocation in the wake of trade 
reforms is limited in developing countries, possibly due to labour market rigidities 
[Goldberg & Pavenik (2004)]. Topalova (2004, 2006) also find no evidence of any 
significant reallocation of labour in a sample of Indian states. Keeping such 
considerations in mind, this study investigates the inter-industry wage structure over 
time. The analysis is undertaken for 51 industries of the organised manufacturing sector 
at the three digit level of the National Industrial Classification, 1998 (NIC-98) for the 
period 1973-74 to 2003-04. 
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A handful of recent studies [e.g. Dutta (2007), Mishra & Kumar (2008)] using 
individual data on wages from household surveys in India estimates the returns to 
industry affiliation after controlling for individual characteristics2 and then examines the 
effect of trade protection on such industry wage premiums. These two studies, using the 
same dataset on individual wages and using similar analytical approaches3 convey very 
contrasting results, which served as a primary motivation behind this ongoing study. Our 
paper is similar to Dutta (2007) and Mishra & Kumar (2008) in its focus on inter-industry 
wage differences, rather than on wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers 
as in Banga (2005b), Chamarbagwala (2006) and Sen (2009). However, in spite of the 
similarity in spirit, our paper is different from Dutta (2007) and Mishra & Kumar (2008) 
in both nature and scope. Unlike them, our paper use industries rather than workers as the 
unit of analysis, as in Hanson and Harrison (1999) and Sen (2009). Since the data on 
wage rates for similar type of workers (production workers in our case) by industry is 
continuous and available annually spanning over 31 years, this allows us to explore the 
time dimension of the changing inter-industry wage structure in a more rigorous manner. 
As Sen (2009) points out, this is particularly relevant in the Indian case, where trade 
reforms have been incremental and have taken place very gradually over time and 
unevenly across sectors. In contrast the wage data for individuals used in Dutta (2007) 
and Mishra & Kumar (2008) is available for only five years, coinciding with the years 
that the NSSO conducted employment surveys in the country. Hence these studies based 
on the NSSO data may not fully capture the impact of the gradual and uneven diffusion 
of the reforms over many years. 
The other significant contribution of this paper that distinguishes it from the 
existing literature is its methodology to analyse the changing inter-industry wage 
structure in India in the wake of the economic reforms. In order to study the potential 
differential impact of liberalisation in different industries, we conduct the analysis at the 
industry level by estimating, in the first instance, the growth of wages. However, our 
paper brings out the potential flaws in the conventional methods of measuring growth 
based on OLS principles that are prevalently used in academic research and highly 
                                                 
2 The portion of individual wages that accrues to the worker’s industry affiliation after controlling for 
worker characteristics is often referred to as wage premium in the labour economics literature. 
3 While their individual wages data is from the same source and they both use the same analytical 
framework, their trade data is from different sources. See Dutta (2007) for a detailed exposition. 
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popularised by international organisations like the World Bank and OECD. This 
approach, which is based on fitting an exponential trend to a time series, is to regress the 
natural logarithm of the variable on a constant and a linear trend, where the OLS estimate 
of the coefficient on the trend is the required growth rate of the variable. We argue that 
when the natural logarithm of the variable under study contains a unit root and hence is 
non-stationary, the OLS based technique to estimate growth of the variable will 
potentially give an estimate that is not a valid representation of the true growth rate. In 
fact, in the presence of a unit root, the growth rate of a series is not well defined in the 
sense that there is no deterministic component of the growth in the series and that the 
growth in the series is purely the cumulative impact of a stochastic process. On the other 
hand, the statistical representation of a series as containing a unit root is not easy to 
separate from an alternative description which represents the series as fundamentally 
deterministic (no unit root) but containing a structural break. We reserve a more detailed 
exposition of this to the methodology discussion in section three below.  
The main goal of this paper is to therefore present an empirical basis as well as 
justification to further explore the relation between liberalisation and wages in India. The 
paper shows that there is a significant difference in the growth rates of wages by industry, 
thus implying a growing inter-industry wage inequality. This in turn means that the wage 
gap between similar types of workers but employed in different industries are increasing. 
Hence the study provides new empirical evidence from India to support the need to 
empirically verify the hypothesis that industry affiliation is an important determinant of 
wages. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two presents a background 
of the economic reforms in India. A comprehensive discussion of the issues and 
appropriate techniques in estimating growth rate of wages by industry is presented in the   
methodology in Section three. In section four, we discuss the data that we use in this 
study. In section five, we examine the inter-industry wage structure for the organised 
manufacturing sector in India by presenting our results on the estimation of the growth 
rates of real wages per worker by industry and discussing the theoretical interpretations 
and empirical implications. Finally section seven summarises our findings, present some 
concluding remarks and policy implications of the findings. 
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2. Background to the economic reforms in India 
Since her independence from the British rule in 1947, India had adopted an 
inward looking policy of import substitution industrialisation (hereafter, ISI) with the 
ultimate intention of self reliance and industrialisation. The Industrial Policy Resolution 
of 1948, which marked a fundamental departure from the earlier policy of laissez-faire, as 
under the British rule, laid the responsibility of initiating and regulating development in 
key sectors of the economy on the government through planning and state intervention 
[Kapila (2006)]. 
Bhagwati & Desai (1970), Bhagwati & Srinivasan (1975) and Srinivasan (2006) 
point out that throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, an elaborate and complex system of 
government control over production, investment, technology and locational choice, prices 
and foreign trade was in existence in India following its institution in the mid-1950’s. 
They further point out that such a strategy failed to produce rapid growth, self-reliance 
and eradication of poverty but rather led to lackluster growth, an internationally 
uncompetitive industrial structure, a perpetually precarious balance of payments, and, 
above all, extensive and often successful rent seeking and the corruption of social, 
economic and political systems.  
2.1 Trade and Industrial Reforms: Initial Attempts in 1980s 
A systematic analysis of the available literature on India’s reform policies show 
that India’s efforts at trade liberalisation roughly started as early as the beginning of the 
1980’s. The process of relaxation of regulation of industries began still earlier in the 
1970’s [Panagariya (2004)], although the pace of the reforms picked up significantly only 
after 1985. There was a gradual liberalisation of import controls in the 1980’s as is 
clearly portrayed by a steady increase in the items of capital and intermediate goods in 
OGL4  [see Das (2005) and Panagariya (2004) for a detailed review]. Another important 
                                                 
4 OGL stands for Open General Licensing. OGL was an instrument of import licensing- one of the most 
pervasive non-tariff barrier. Any item under the OGL list was allowed to be imported almost freely subject 
to licensing. However, the use of OGL was circumscribed by the actual user policy, which allowed imports 
by the importer for his own use and not for trade in that item. Like the OGL, two other instruments of 
import licensing were the Banned List (did not allow any imports at all) and Restricted and Limited 
Permissible List (allowed imports under strict regulation). See Das (2001, 2003 and 2005) for a detailed 
exposition of Trade Policy Instruments and Choudhury (2007) for a review. 
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source of liberalisation was the decline in the share of the canalised5 imports in total 
imports, which fell substantially since 1981 from 67 percent to 50 percent in 1985-86 
[Das (2005)] and further declined to 27 percent in 1986-87 [Panagariya (2004)]. 
Furthermore, Pursell (1992, pg 441) highlights “ imports that were neither canalized nor 
subjected to licensing increased from about 5 percent in 1980-81 to about 30 percent in 
1987-88”. As far as tariff rates are concerned, two major studies by Das (2003, 2005) 
pinpoint that most items on which tariff rates were lowered were not manufactured in 
India. This was essentially done to encourage the modernisation and development of 
industries which use these items.  
It is important to point out here that even though the 1980’s witnessed only mere 
changes in the trade restricting policies of India, with additions and deductions in various 
lists be it banned, restricted or OGL, mere reductions in tariff rates and fall in share of 
canalised imports in total imports; these developments represent the first signs of efforts 
at reducing the degree of trade restrictiveness facing the Indian industries. Apart from 
trade liberalisation this period also saw the relaxation of domestic industrial controls and 
related reforms including de-licensing of industries, broad banding (which allowed firms 
to switch productions between similar production lines), relaxations in the Monopolies 
and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) 1969 Act, abolition of price and distribution 
controls on cement and aluminum and a major reform in the tax system including the 
introduction of MODVAT (Modified Value Added Tax) tax in March 1986. The 
relaxation of these industrial regulations further reinforced the ongoing trade 
liberalisation [Panagariya (2004)]6. 
2.2 Trade and Industrial Reforms: Radical Changes in 1990s 
The considerable but luke warm efforts at liberalisation in the 1980’s paved the 
way for more substantial but systematic liberalisation in the 1990’s and beyond. In 1991, 
a drastic reforms process including trade liberalisation was initiated in the wake of a 
severe macro-economic crisis faced by the Indian economy. Table 1 shows the reduction 
in average tariffs in several industrial sectors thus highlighting the immediate impact of 
the 1991 reforms. 
                                                 
5 Sometimes governments exercise control over imports by granting certain organisations (State Trading 
Agencies or other state owned enterprises) selective monopoly powers to import and export strategic 
commodities. This process has been termed as canalisation by World Bank (1994). 
6 For a detailed review of industrial liberalisation, see Panagariya (2004) and Joshi and Little (1996). 
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The economic reforms of 1991 did away with the practice of import licensing. 
Hasan et al. (2007) reports that 26 import licensing lists were eliminated though a 
“negative list” was created, which included items which required import licensing. The 
abolition of import licensing was mainly on virtually all intermediate and capital goods 
[Das (2003, 2005)]. But consumer goods, which accounted for about 30 percent of the 
tariff lines, still remained under licensing until recently in April 1, 2001, when they were 
freed of licensing, following a challenge by India’s trading partners at the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the WTO [Panagariya (2004)]. In addition to these, import policy has 
also seen reforms in the form of substantial reduction in canalisation and a decrease in the 
share of products subject to Quantitative Restrictions. Table 2 shows the decline of 
import controls in India in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. 
As far as the tariff rates were concerned, India witnessed substantial reductions in 
both levels and dispersions in tariffs in the 1990s. Average tariffs fell from more than 
90% in 1987 to under 30% in 1997 and the standard deviation of tariffs fell by almost 
70% between the same periods [Topalova (2004)] as portrayed in Figure 1. With respect 
to trade policy, the EXIM policies of 1992-1997 and 1997-2003 were aimed to rationalise 
the tariff structure, simplify the trade procedures and bring transparency to the regime. 
The 1991 initiated reforms went beyond trade liberalisation to embrace domestic 
industrial policy and trade in services. The Industrial Policy of 1991 often termed in 
Indian economic literature as the New Industrial policy did away with industrial licensing 
with very few exemptions on grounds of health, safety, security and environmental 
standards. It also limited public sector monopoly to eight sectors only, which was further 
trimmed down to include railway transportation and atomic energy only. In addition to 
these the new industrial policy also relaxed most of the entry restrictions earlier prevalent 
under the MRTP Act. Furthermore it initiated a policy of automatic approval for foreign 
direct investment up to 51 percent which has been further relaxed in the subsequent years 
[Panagariya (2004)]. In addition to industrial policy and trade policy liberalisation, the 
reforms in the 1990s have witnessed a drastic liberalisation of the services sector 
including key sectors like banking, insurance and telecommunications, which prior to this 
were subject to excessive levels of government intervention.  
Furthermore, the above reforms were also accompanied by relaxation of exchange 
controls that acted as an extra layer of restrictions on imports [Panagariya (2004)]. 
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Panagariya highlights that as part of the 1991 reforms, the government devalued the 
rupee by 22 percent from INR 21.2 to INR 25.8 against the dollar. Later in February 
1992, a dual exchange rate system was introduced, which further led India to accept the 
IMF VIII obligations in 1994, which made the rupee officially convertible on the current 
account, but importantly, not on the capital account.  
2.3 Labour Market Reforms 
The labour laws in India essentially cover workers working in the organised 
sector only. Labour market legislation is enforced through the provisions of different 
Central Acts and Laws- the Factories Act of 1948 regulates working conditions, the 
Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) 
Act of 1946 regulate employment security and the Trade Union Act (TUA) of 1926 
regulates trade union activity. 
While a comprehensive review of the labour market legislation in India is beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is important to highlight that the opinions on the pace and 
further need of labour market reforms in India remain highly polarised. On one hand, pro-
reforms analysts [like, Datta Chaudhuri (1996), Panagariya (2007)] believe that the 
numerous labour laws in India have created rigidities in the labour market.  On the other 
hand, there are analysts [like, Nagaraj (2002), Dutta (2003)] who offer counterarguments 
to the above view by highlighting that labour regulations in India are either ignored or 
circumvented thus rendering them ineffective. In addition to this, Besley and Burgess 
(2004) point out that firms located in different states in India face different and often 
confused regulatory environments due to the entitlement of both central and state 
governments to legislate on labour issues. 
The labour market reforms in India have not picked up momentum despite the 
extensive and radical trade and industrial policy reforms. In fact, Dutta (2007) points out 
that reforms aimed at increasing flexibility with respect to laying off employees, 
outsourcing and sub-contracting were initialised only in 2002. Besides, there is a 
prevalent wage setting system in India, whereby the Wage Boards and Pay Commissions 
generally sets wages in the public sector, which sets the benchmark for private sector 
wages. The labour market regulations along with the wage setting system and labour 
redundancy have introduced rigidities in the organised labour market [Dutta (2007)].  
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2.4 A Summary of the Reforms      
 In the above assessment of the reforms in India, which clearly highlight that the 
economy is in a transition, three key features are worth noting. First, there has been a 
continuous attempt in the 1980s to relax and simplify certain policy regulations and carry 
out reforms, albeit half-hearted. This marks India’s first attempt at reforms, which is 
much ahead of the otherwise hyped 1991 episode of reforms. Second, the reforms really 
took off in the 1990s following the IMF induced structural and macro-economic reforms 
in 1991. And third, the reforms in the 1980s and 1990s loosened both trade restrictions as 
well as domestic controls. However, labour market reforms have been weak and there are 
considerable polarised opinions whether the labour regulations in India have at all created 
any labour market rigidities.  
 3. Methodology 
When it comes to estimating growth rate of a sufficiently long time series, the 
most commonly used method is the method of least-squares. The least-square growth rate 
is estimated by fitting an exponential trend to a time series variable, or alternately, by 
fitting a linear trend line to the logarithmic values of the variable in the relevant period. 
In other words, growth rates over long periods of time are estimated by regressing the 
logarithm of the variable under consideration on a deterministic trend, i.e., 
tt tY εβα ++=)ln(          (1), 
The growth rate of the series Yt is calculated as g = exp (β)-1, where β is typically 
estimated from (1) by OLS. For very small growth rates, β is approximately equal to g 
and hence the growth rate is often reported as the OLS estimate of β from (1) rather than 
g. 7 Thus, using (1) to estimate the growth rate of a series corresponds to fitting a trend 
line to the natural logarithm of the time series under consideration and hence such an 
estimate of growth rate is equivalent, in theory and principle, to the well known 
conventional compounded constant annual growth rate (CAGR)8. This technique is very 
                                                 
7 For example, if β = 0.01, then g = 0.01005, or alternatively, when β implies 1% growth, g implies 1.005% 
growth. While, on the other hand, if β = 0.1 then g = 0.1052, or alternatively, when β implies 10% growth, 
g implies 10.52% growth. 
8 CAGR is the geometric mean growth rate on an annualised basis. If we assume continuous compounding 
(i.e. the compounding period is infinitesimally small) of a series, then we have Yt = Y0 e
βt, where Y0 is the 
initial value of the series at t = 0 and β is the CAGR (also called exponential growth rate). Taking natural 
logarithms on both sides, we get ln(Yt) = ln(Y0)+βt, which is equivalent to (1). β can be estimated by OLS 
and represents the CAGR of the series. 
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commonly used in the social sciences including economics and financial research. For 
instance, international organizations like the World Bank and OECD generally use this 
log-linear trend model based on least square principles to estimate growth rates of various 
indicator variables for which a long time series is available. Least-squares growth rates 
are used in the World Bank publications when measuring trend-wise growth in economic 
variables such as GDP, and GNP per capita (World Bank Statistical Manual9). Similarly 
least-squares growth rates are used by the OECD whenever there is a sufficiently long 
time series to permit a reliable calculation [OECD (2005)]. 
The use of the log-linear trend model based on least-square principles to estimate 
growth rates, as presented in (1), is very common among empirical researchers and has 
almost become a norm in economic research. However, an important issue that is often 
not addressed, when using such a model to estimate growth rates, is that what happens 
when the natural log of the variable [ln(Yt)] in (1) contains a unit root i.e. it is non-
stationary. This is important because to what extent the estimate of growth rate using (1) 
reflects the stochastic or deterministic component of the equation depends crucially on 
whether ln(Yt) contains a unit root or not.  If ln(Yt) contains no unit root, then the series is 
stationary and hence the estimate of growth rate from (1) is a valid representation of the 
true growth rate. If, on the other hand, ln(Yt) contains a unit root implying that the series 
is not stationary, then the average constant growth rate as hypothesised in (1) is not well 
defined. The reason behind this is that, if ln(Yt) is a non-stationary process, then the error 
term, εt, in (1) is not well-behaved 10 and hence it is the stochastic component (i.e. εt) of 
(1) that drives Yt rather than its deterministic component (i.e. t). In fact, it can be shown11 
that the growth in the series is purely the cumulative impact of a stochastic process and 
hence the OLS estimate of β from (1) would be like some spurious representation of 
growth, which actually does not exist. In the rest of the paper, we’ll refer such an 
estimate of growth as “pseudo growth rate”, which should be interpreted with caution. 
Further, econometrically speaking, under such a situation, α cannot be consistently 
                                                 
9 For more on growth rate estimation methodology used by the world bank, see (permanent URL at world 
bank site) : http://go.worldbank.org/6ZTES0VQQ0 
10 This means that the error term is not an I(0) white noise process. 
11 See Chatterji and Choudhury (2010) for a detailed exposition of the theoretical issues and empirical 
implications on the estimation of growth rates in the potential presence of a unit root. 
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estimated by any method, and the OLS estimator of β is no longer asymptotically 
efficient. 
Now, it can be argued that the typical way around the non-stationarity problem, as 
noted above, is to consider a first differenced variant of the log-linear trend model in (1), 
which gives, 
tt uY +=∆ β)ln(          (2), 
where ∆ is the first difference operator, β is a constant and ut is an I(0) white noise 
process. The OLS estimator of β in (2) is now asymptotically efficient and is our required 
estimate of the growth rate of the series. However, this first differenced variant of the 
log-linear trend model (hereafter, log-difference model) is not free from criticism and it is 
important to point out three key limitations of this model. First, this method gives an 
estimate of growth rate (if it exists), which is equivalent, in theory and principle, to the 
conventional average constant annual growth rate (AAGR)12, rather than the CAGR. But 
since AAGR is simply the (linear) average of the period-to-period growth rates, it is more 
vulnerable to outliers than the CAGR and hence if the growth rate is particularly high (or 
low) between two consecutive periods for some reason, then this is going to pull up (or 
down) the estimate of the (constant) average growth rate for the entire period. Second, the 
conventional statistics (like adjusted-R2, t-ratios etc.)  associated with (1) and (2) would 
be very different from each other and hence any further statistical inferences based on (1) 
and (2) may potentially give contrasting conclusions. Third, and most importantly, if the 
natural log of the time series variable under study contains a unit root and hence is non-
stationary at the very first place, then we have already argued that growth is cumulative 
impact of a stochastic process and under such a situation, it is not clear what does the 
point estimate from (2) even mean and it should be interpreted with caution. In fact it 
again gives us a “pseudo growth rate” even though, this time, the estimate is 
asymptotically efficient. Theoretically, when a series is trend-stationary and hence 
growth rate exists, its estimate from the log-linear method (CAGR) should be identical to 
that from the log-difference method (AAGR) [Altinay (2004)]. And it is probably for this 
reason that inferences based on (2) might give contrasting conclusions to that based on 
(1), as pointed out above.  
                                                 
12 The AAGR, in principle, is the average of the period-to-period (annual) growth rate of a time-series 
variable. 
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While the above noted issue in the estimation of growth rates has not attracted any 
explicit attention in the economics literature, there have been some recent attempts to 
address this issue. For example, Baffes and Vallee (2003) and Altinay (2004) highlight 
that the trend-stationarity versus unit root dichotomy is an important issue to be 
considered when estimating growth rate of a series using the log-linear trend model. In 
particular, Baffes and Valle (2003) assess the performance of their growth regressions by 
exploring the stationarity properties of the error term of the log-linear trend equation [i.e. 
εt is (1)]13 on the basis of conventional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests as well as 
Monte Carlo simulations. In contrast, we argue that a simpler approach is to follow a 
two-step procedure. First, determine the stationarity properties of ln(Yt), where Yt is the 
time-series variable under study. Second, if ln(Yt) is trend-stationary, then proceed with 
estimation of growth rates using (1), or alternatively, if ln(Yt) is non-stationary, then 
proceed with estimation of growth rates using (2). However, we emphasise that when 
ln(Yt) is non-stationary, then the estimate of growth rate of the series from (2) is 
asymptotically efficient but it is still a “pseudo growth rate” and hence should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Thus, we emphasise the fact that the testing of the stationarity of a time series 
variable is a pre-condition to the estimation of growth rates using a log-linear model as 
described above. However, under a two step procedure as suggested above, the empirical 
concern is about the type of the unit root tests used in testing whether the natural log of 
the variable under study contains a unit root or not. It is now a well known fact in the 
econometrics literature that the conventional and commonly used Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (hereafter, ADF) test, based on the statistical methodology put forward by Dickey 
and Fuller (1979, 1981), is not a very powerful test. In the presence of structural break(s) 
in a time series variable, the ADF test is biased towards the “acceptance” of the null 
[Perron (1989)], i.e. it is biased towards the unit root hypothesis. The time series 
literature therefore argues that using such a test would lead one to believe that most series 
contain a unit root and are hence non-stationary [like in the seminal work of Nelson and 
Plosser (1982)] when in reality the series might simply be trend-stationary but 
                                                 
13  In fact, if the error term in (1) follows a first order autoregressive process, 
ttt u+= −1ρεε , with ρ being 
the highest autoregressive root and ut an I(0) white noise process, then it can be shown that ln(Yt) is I(1) 
when ρ=1 and hence it is non-stationary. See Chatterji & Choudhury (2010) for a detailed exposition. 
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characterised by a structural break, which the test would fail to take into account. Under 
such circumstances, we would be forced to believe that using (1) to estimate the growth 
rate of the series would result in an asymptotically inefficient estimate which would not 
be a valid representation of the actual growth rate. This would lead us to take the first 
difference of (1) in order to ensure that natural logarithm of the series under study is 
stationary, giving us (2), the limitations of which we have already highlighted above. 
This clearly highlights the pitfalls of using the conventional ADF procedure to test for a 
unit root, whose inability to allow for a structural break(s), may wrongly lead to estimate 
the growth rate using the first differenced model (2), which in turn might result in 
spurious inferences. 
Given the pitfalls of the ADF test, Perron (1989) proposed to allow for one 
exogenously dated structural break (level break, slope break or both) in the ADF test 
procedure. However, Christiano (1992) criticised Perron’s known (or exogenous) 
assumption of the break date by arguing that it involves an element of “data mining”. 
Similarly, Zivot and Andrews (1992) argue that Perron’s assumption of known 
breakpoint is based on prior observation of the data and hence problems associated with 
“pre-testing” are applicable to his procedure. Since then, the ensuing literature addressed 
this problem of the known break date by adopting a completely agnostic approach, where 
a complete and systematic search is done to endogenously determine the break date. 
Some of these include Perron and Vogelsang (1992), Banerjee et al. (1992), Zivot and 
Andrews (1992), Amsler and Lee (1995), Perron (1997), Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), 
Clemente et al. (1998), Lee and Strazicich (2001, 2003), among others. However, in spite 
of the similarity in the assumption of the endogenous break(s), there are methodological 
differences among some of these tests. While a complete review of these methodological 
differences is beyond the scope of this paper14, we would like to point out that the two 
key features on which these differences are based are (a) whether the test is based on 
ADF procedure or otherwise, (b) whether the break is imposed under the null or the 
alternate hypotheses or both. 
                                                 
14 For a chronological review of the evolution of the literature on the unit root hypothesis, see Perron 
(2005) and Glynn et al. (2007) and for a detailed exposition of the theoretical issues in some of these 
methodologies, see Chatterji & Choudhury (2010). 
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In this paper, we carry out the ADF test, Perron (1989) test (with an exogenously 
specified date for the break at 1991) and the Lee and Strazicich (2003) test (which 
endogenously determines two breaks and hence, hereafter, referred as LS2 in the rest of 
the paper) to test whether the natural log of real wages per worker for a sample of 51 
industries from the organised manufacturing sector in India for the period 1973- 2003 
(see the data section for more details about the data) contains a unit root or not15. The 
justification for choosing 1991 as the break date in the Perron test is due to India’s IMF 
induced structural and macro-economic reforms in 1991, which marks the change of a 
policy regime from inward looking industrialisation (ISI) regime towards a outward 
looking relatively market friendly regime. However, also keeping in view of the evidence 
that India also witnessed some half-hearted reforms in 1980s and more radical reforms in 
1990s, as presented in Section 2, we carry out the LS2 test which endogenously 
determines two breaks.  We summarise the null and alternate hypotheses of these tests 
that we adopt in this paper in Table 3. When using the Perron and LS2 test, we allow for 
structural break(s) in the series, based on Perron’s (1989) original Model (C)16, that 
allows for one level and one slope break and if we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root, we can carry out the estimation of growth rate using (1). However, in this case, we 
will have two (or three) estimates of growth rate for a single series: one for the pre-break 
(or the pre- first break) sample and one for the post-break (or the post- first break/ pre- 
second break) sample (and one for the post- second break sample). But both (or all three) 
estimates would be a valid representation of the true growth of the two (or three) sub-
samples of the entire period. This would be equivalent to fitting two (or three) separate 
trend lines, by ordinary least squares, to the two (or three) sub-samples of the natural log 
of the variable respectively17.  
                                                 
15 A more detailed comparison of the results of unit root tests on the same dataset used in this paper with 
some of the other unit tests [like Zivot & Andrews (1992) and Lumsdaine & Papell (1997)] is presented in 
our earlier work, Chatterji and Choudhury (2010). 
16 As model (C) is a more general model that allows for both level break and slope break, we prefer this 
model over Perron’s models (A) and (B), which respectively allow for a level break and slope break. 
17 If ln(Yt) is trend-stationary with a break, say, at t = TB, where 1<TB<T we cannot use (1) to obtain an 
asymptotically efficient estimate of the growth rate for the whole period. However, we can use (1) to fit 
two separate trend lines by OLS to the two sub-periods, t = 1, 2, …, TB and t = TB+1, …,T, or, alternately, 
we can use dummy variables for the two different sub-samples, and estimate the growth rates for the two 
sub-periods by fitting a single equation, as follows: tt utDtDDDY ++++= 22112211)ln( ββαα , where Dj is a 
dummy variable which takes the value 1 in the j-th sub-period and 0 otherwise. The estimates of β1 and β2 
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4. Data and Data Treatment 
This study draws data from the EPW Research Foundation (India) who has 
collated data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), published by the Central 
Statistical Organisation, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 
Government of India. ASI provides reasonably comprehensive and reliable industrial 
estimates at a disaggregated level for the organised manufacturing sector in India. It 
covers the entire factory sector except factories under the control of Defence Ministry, 
Oil storage depots and technical training institutes. ‘Factories’ are those which are 
registered as such under 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948 which respectively 
relates to units which employ 10 or more workers with the aid of power and units  which 
employ 20 or more workers without the aid of power. ASI carries out complete 
enumeration of large factories on a census basis, and the remaining on a sample basis, 
where ‘large units’ are defined as factories employing 50 or more workers  with aid of 
power or 100 or more workers without the aid of power. The EPW Research Foundation 
has collected the primary data from the ASI and has made available continuous annual 
data on industries from 1973-74 to 2003-04 after carrying out concordance of different 
series, wherever necessary. 
The data from EPW Research Foundation, used in this study, is for 51 industries 
defined at three digit level of the National Industrial Classification, 1998 (NIC-98) for the 
period 1973-74 to 2003-04 (henceforth 1973 to 2003). A description of the three digit 
industry codes is presented in Appendix Table1. This data is particularly interesting 
because it covers a long and continuous period of time which coincides with India’s 
episode of substantial economic reforms in 1991 that marks the change in the policy 
regime from a highly restrictive ISI regime to a regime that was characterised by radical 
reforms of trade, industrial and foreign exchange policies. We therefore emphasise that 
1991, which marks the change in the policy regime, potentially represents a structural 
break in our data. But given the fact that there were some half-hearted reforms in the 
1980s, before they fully took off in the 1990s, we might potentially have two structural 
breaks- one in the 1980s and one in the 1990s. 
                                                                                                                                                 
are the required growth rates (CAGR) for the two sub-periods. This example can also be extended to a 
series that is trend-stationary with multiple breaks. 
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The paper draws raw data on wages paid to production workers (blue-collar 
workers) reported in current rupees along with data on total number of workers by 
industry. Using the consumer price index (CPI) for industrial workers (with base 1982) to 
deflate wages to workers, we arrive at real wages to workers which we further divide by 
the total number of workers to arrive at real wages per worker (i.e. annual average real 
wages by industry). The data on CPI used to deflate the nominal figures is taken from the 
Handbook of Indian Statistics, Reserve Bank of India, 2001. 
 
5. The changing inter-industry wage structure in India 
In this section, we analyse the changing inter-industry wage structure in India by 
comparing the growth of wages by industry. In particular, to study any potential 
differential impact of liberalisation on different industries, we estimate the growth rates 
in average real wages by industry based on the techniques discussed in the methodology 
section above and examine whether there is any evidence of changing inter-industry wage 
inequality in the organised manufacturing sector in India. 
We first estimate the growth rate of real wage per worker for each industry by 
using (1) without considering whether each series is stationary or not. These results, 
which are estimates of CAGR of real wage per worker for the 51 industries, are presented 
in Table 4. A quick glance at the table shows that the growth in real wages in the period 
1973-2003 has been very diverse across the 51 industries- industries like 311 
(Manufactures of electric motors, generators and transformers), 154 (Manufacture of 
other food products) and 281 (Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs 
and steam generators) have very strong positive growth rates of 5.3%, 4.2% and 3.9% 
respectively, while industries like 312 (Manufacture of electricity distribution and control 
apparatus), 192 (Manufacture of footwear) and 300 (Manufacture of office, computer and 
accounting machinery) have very low growth rates of -1.1%, -0.4% and 0.76% 
respectively. However, since we haven’t tested for the stationarity of the natural 
logarithim of real wage per worker for each industry, we cannot be certain that the 
estimates of growth rates presented in Table 4 are a valid representation of the true 
growth rates. Hence we conduct an ADF test on each series and find that the natural 
logarithm of real wages per worker is trend-stationary only for 21 out of 51 industries. 
This shows that 30 of the estimates of growth rates presented in Table 4 are not only 
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asymptotically inefficient but are also “pseudo growth rates”. We therefore retain the 
estimates of growth rate of real wages per worker based on (1) for the 21 industries, for 
which the series are trend-stationary and use (2) to estimate the growth rates for the rest 
of the 30 industries, for which the series are non-stationary. Note that using (1) gives us 
estimates of CAGR, while (2) gives estimates of AAGR. However the AAGR estimates 
of real wages per worker for the 30 industries should be interpreted with caution as they 
still represent some kind of meaningless “pseudo growth rate”, even though they are now 
asymptotically efficient. We present the ADF test results and the CAGR and AAGR 
estimates in Table 5.  
Theoretically, when a series is trend stationary, then the growth rate estimate from 
the log-linear method in (1) which gives CAGR should be identical to that from the log-
difference method in (2) which gives AAGR, a point that we highlighted earlier. In Table 
5, we can see that the growth rate estimates from both the methods yield very similar 
results for the series which are trend-stationary, while that for the series which are non-
stationary, the growth rate estimates from the two methods differ significantly for 
majority of the cases. But interestingly, no matter which method we trust more, we still 
observe a trend of growing inter-industry wage inequality. Table 5 shows that there is 
considerable variation in the growth rates of real wage per worker between industries. 
The top five industries that saw the highest growth in average real wages for the whole 
period, 1973-2003, are industry 311 (Manufacture of electric motors, generators and 
transformers), industry 281 (Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs 
and steam generators), industry 321 (Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and 
other electronic components), industry 341 (Manufacture of motor vehicles)  and industry 
221 (Publishing), which witnessed very strong positive growth rates of 5.2%, 3.9%, 
3.8%, 3.6%, 3.3% and 3.1% respectively. While on the other hand, the bottom five 
industries that saw the lowest growth in average real wages for the same period are 
industry 312, industry 192, industry 323, industry 171 and industry 242,  which witnessed 
very low (and even negative, in some cases,) growth rates of -1.33%, -0.44%, 0.18%, 
0.37% and 0.58% respectively. On an average, the whole period growth rate of average 
real wages, for all the industries, is 1.68%, while the median stands at a moderate 1.54%. 
We summarise this information in Table 6, which clearly highlights a changing inter-
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industry wage structure for production workers in manufacturing industries in India 
during the period 1973-2003. 
But given the criticism of the power of the ADF test, due to its inability to 
account for any existing structural breaks, as noted in section 3, we test whether the ADF 
tests used above were biased because possible structural break(s) were ignored. We 
therefore consider Perron’s (1989) test which allows for one exogenous break (both 
intercept and slope break). Despite the criticism that such an assumption is based on prior 
observation of the data and hence problems associated with “pre-testing” are applicable 
to the test, we argue that such an assumption of an exogenous break is relevant to our 
data on real wages for the 51 Indian industries as India witnessed a substantial change in 
her policy regime in 1991, as discussed in section 2. Prior to 1991 India was a staunch 
believer of inward looking ISI policies, while in 1991 there was a radical change in 
outlook resulting in the adoption of a massive economic reforms program, of which trade 
liberalisation was an important component. We therefore emphasise that 1991, which 
marks a change in the policy regime, potentially represents a structural break in our data 
and hence we use Perron’s (1989) methodology to test the unit root hypothesis allowing 
for an exogenous break in 1991. We present the results18 for the Perron test with one 
exogenously specified break at 1991 in Column 2 of Table 7.  
Table 7 shows that, when we introduce an exogenous break in 1991, the logs of 
real wages per worker for 23 industries out of 51 industries are trend-stationary. This is 
slightly better than the ADF test results where 21 out of 51 series were trend stationary. 
But if we compare the results of the ADF test (Table 5) with that of the Perron test (Table 
7) that allows for a structural break (both level and slope) in 1991 more carefully, we find 
that the logs of real wage per worker for 15 industries which were not stationary 
according to the ADF test become trend-stationary when we allow for a break in 1991 
using Perron’s (1989) methodology. However, interestingly, the logs of real wage per 
worker for 13 industries which were earlier trend-stationary according to the ADF test are 
now shown to be non-stationary when we introduce a break in 1991.While the remaining 
                                                 
18 For compactness, we just present the final results of the test along with the break date(s). For majority of 
the series, the t-statistics on estimated coefficients are significant at conventional levels of significance. 
Detailed output files (GAUSS files) are available from the authors upon request. 
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23 industries out of the 51 industries does not exhibit any change in the conclusions19 of 
the ADF test, even when we allow for the break in 1991- 15 of the series which were 
non-stationary according to the ADF test also remain non-stationary according to 
Perron’s test, while 8 of the series which were trend-stationary according to the ADF test 
are still shown to be trend-stationary by Perron’s test. We present these comparisons in 
Table 8. The implications of these findings on growth rate estimation is that we can now 
use (1) to obtain meaningful estimates of growth rate (CAGR) for the 15 series which 
were shown to be non-stationary by the ADF test (see Table 5) earlier but are now trend-
stationary when we account for the break at 1991 (see Table 7). However, we will have to 
use a dummy variable to distinguish the two periods20- the pre-break and the post-break 
periods- which will thus give us two growth rates for the two sub-periods. These 
estimates of growth rates will be not only be unbiased and asymptotically efficient but 
will also be valid representation of the true growth of the series for the two sub-periods. 
These results are presented in Table 9. This time, we can see that in the pre-break period, 
which represents the pre-reforms period (1973-1991), the growth rates of real wage per 
worker for the 15 industries are all strongly positive and for 9 out of the 15, the growth 
rates are more than 3%. On an average, the pre-reforms growth of real wages per worker, 
for all 15 industries, is 3.1% (with a standard deviation of 0.005), while the median 
stands at 3.2% (see Table 9). However, in the post-break period which represents the 
post-reforms period (1992-2003), only 1 out of 15 industries has growth rate higher than 
3% and 9 out of 15 have negative growth in real wages per worker. The average post-
reforms growth of real wages per worker, for all 15 industries, stands at -0.42% (with a 
standard deviation of 0.016) and a median of -0.39% (see Table 9). Two immediate 
conclusions follow from these findings. First, these results reinforce our previous finding 
based on Table 5 and Table 6 that the inter-industry wage structure in India has 
constantly changed in the period 1973-2003. Second, this change has been more 
prominent and adverse in the post-reforms period thus suggesting that the reforms have 
not been favourable for the growth of real wages for production workers and that the 
                                                 
19 Of course, the t-statistics on the estimated coefficients are different between the ADF test and Perron’s 
test and hence the statistical level of significance at which the null is rejected or not will be different for the 
two tests, even though the final verdict on whether the series is stationary or not still remains the same. 
20 Or alternately, we can fit two separate trend lines to the two sub-samples of the entire period as discussed 
in section 3. 
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dispersion in the rate at which the inter-industry wage structure is changing has become 
more pronounced in the post-reforms period of 1992-2003. 
But, we still recognise the criticism of the exogeneity assumption of the break in 
Perron’s (1989) test that it involves an element of ‘data mining’. Furthermore, there has 
been recent evidence, as presented in section 2, that the reforms in India have actually 
been initialised much before 1991 and that the effect of these reforms were not felt 
immediately but with a lag [see, for example, Das (2001), Panagariya (2004, 2007), 
Choudhury (2007), Sen (2009)] and hence the break date might not coincide with the 
year in which the major reforms were initialised. Given this, we therefore consider Lee 
and Strazicich’s (2003) unit root test (hereafter, LS2) that allows for two breaks under 
both the null and the alternate hypothesis. We present the results21  for this test along with 
the break dates in Column 3 of Table 7.  
Turning back to Table 7 this time, we can see that when we use the LS2 test that 
allow for two breaks that are determined endogenously, we find that the log of the real 
wages per worker becomes stationary for a greater number of industries. In particular, we 
find that 49 out of 51 series are trend-stationary, with two endogenously determined 
breaks, which are statistically significant for majority of the cases22, and range from 1983 
to 2000, as presented in Table 7. The first break occurs in the pre-reforms period (prior to 
1991) for 47 industries, while the second break occurs in the post-reforms period (post 
1991) for 42 industries. Given the results of the LS2 test, we can use (1) to estimate three 
sub-period growth rates (CAGR) of real wage per worker for the 49 industries, for which 
the series were found to be trend-stationary with two endogenously determined breaks. 
We use the dummy variable method as discussed in Section 3. However, we present the 
results for only those industries, the break dates for which are identical to that of at least 
one other industry. For example, both industries 151 (Production, processing and 
preserving of meat, fish, fruits, veg., oils and fats) and 210 (Manufacture of paper and 
paper products) have 1985 as their first break and 1997 as their second break. Similarly, 
industries 181 (Manufacturing of wearing apparel, except for fur apparel), 314 
(Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries) and 361 
                                                 
21 See footnote 18. 
22 Since the second break is statistically significant for majority of the series, we conclude that it is 
reasonable as well as justifiable to account for two breaks when conducting the LS2 unit root tests. Detailed 
GAUSS output files are available from the authors, upon request. 
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(Manufacture of furniture) have their first break in 1983 and their second break in 1986. 
The purpose of this is to compare how these industries have performed in terms of 
growth of real wages within the same sub-period and hence we keep those industries out, 
which do not have break dates which are identical to those of at least one other industry, 
even though the growth rate estimates (CAGR) for them are well defined and 
asymptotically efficient. We present these results in Table 10.  
The growth rate (CAGR) estimates of real wages per worker for production 
workers by industry presented in Table 10 highlight a clearer picture of the inter-industry 
wage structure and throw light to the dynamics in both the pre- and post- reforms period. 
However, since the break dates occur at different points in time for different industries, it 
is not possible to highlight a comparison of all the industries together. Nevertheless, the 
analysis leads us to present three important results. First, the impact of liberalisation has 
not been uniform across all the industries. The fact that the break dates occur at different 
time points for different industries (see Table 7) highlight the differential impact of the 
reforms on different industries. In each industry, this amounts to imparting two 
(deterministic) shocks to a wage growth process that is intrinsically stationary. Hence we 
find, for each industry, wage growth varied across three sub-periods. Second, in the case 
of the 49 industries out of 51, for which the natural log of real wage per worker is trend-
stationary with two endogenously determined breaks, the first break occurs in the pre-
liberalisation period (prior to 1991) for 47 industries, while the second break occurs in 
the post-liberalisation period (post 1991) for 42 industries (see Table 7). This result lends 
support to the conjectures that the reforms in India have actually been initialised much 
before 1991 and that the impacts of the radical reforms episode of 1991 were not felt 
immediately, but with a lag. Third, the CAGR estimates of the real wage per worker, 
presented in Table 10, show that the inter-industry wage structure in India has changed a 
lot in the period 1973-2003 and that it provides some evidence that the inter-industry 
wage differences have become more pronounced in the post-reforms period. For 
example, the CAGR of real wages per worker for industries 171 (Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles), 201 (Saw milling and planing of wood), 252 (Manufacture of 
plastic products) and 321 (Manufacture of electronic valves, tubes and other electronic 
components) for the sub-period 1973-87 are 2%, 2%, 3.8% and 4.6% respectively, while 
for the sub-period 1988-2000, the CAGRs are -1.1%, -1.4%, -0.03% and 2.2% 
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respectively. The first sub-period, which coincides with a policy regime in the Indian 
economy that was characterised by restrictive inward looking ISI policies, saw strong 
positive growth in real wages per worker for each of the four industries with an average 
of 3.1% (and standard deviation of 0.013) thus implying that real wages for the average 
worker in each industry was going up. While, on the other hand, the second sub-period, 
which coincides with a policy regime that was characterised by radical reforms of trade 
and industrial policies, witnessed not only a slump in the growth but even negative 
growth rates for some industries, with an average of -0.09% (and standard deviation of 
0.016), thus implying that the inter-industry wage structure deteriorated in the post-
reforms period. Similarly, the CAGR for real wage per worker for industries 181 
(Manufacture of wearing apparel, except for fur apparel), 314 (Manufacture of 
accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries) and 361 (Manufacture of furniture) for 
the sub-period 1973-1983 are 0.5%, 3.4% and 6.6% respectively, for the sub-period 
1984-86 are 4.4%, 4.9% and 15.5% respectively, while for the sub-period 1986-2003, the 
CAGRs are 1.2%, -0.01% and 2.7%. In this case, the first and second sub-periods, which 
again coincides with the pre-reforms period saw moderate to high growth in real wages 
for the 3 industries, while the second sub-period, which overlaps the post-reforms period 
saw negative growth in real wage for 1 industry and moderate to high growth in the other 
two industries. Similarly, a close look at the CAGR estimates of different sub-periods for 
the other industries, in Table 10, shows that the inter-industry wage structure has changed 
more rapidly in the post reforms period.  
The above analysis on the estimation of growth of average real wages for 
production workers (or blue collar workers) from 51 industries of the organised 
manufacturing sector in India for the period 1973-2003 highlights that whatever way one 
estimates the growth of real wages per worker by industry, we find that there is 
considerable variation in the growth of wages across industries, which seems to have 
aggravated further in the post-reforms period. These findings clearly show that the inter-
industry wage differentials have increased in India over time and provide some evidence 
that it has become more pronounced in the post reforms period. An obvious implication 
of these findings is that wages earned by similar type of workers (production workers in 
our case) but employed in different industries are different. But since, individual worker 
wages will obviously depend on the quality of labour and we do not know anything about 
23 
the quality of labour in our dataset, we cannot clearly conclude that being in different 
industries is the most important source of difference in wages among similar type of 
workers. Nevertheless, we argue that, since it is highly unlikely that labour quality will be 
significantly different between industries (given that all industries are manufacturing 
industries and that we are mainly focussing on production workers only), the real wage 
earned by the average production worker significantly depends on the industry he works 
in. This thus provides some evidence to the hypothesis that industry affiliation is an 
important determinant of wage.  
Furthermore, our finding that there has been a tendency for the inter-industry 
wage structure to deteriorate more rapidly in the post-reforms period implies that the 
labour market has failed to adjust despite substantial reforms in the economy. In an ideal 
world with perfect competition in both output and factor markets and perfect factor 
mobility, we would expect that there would be movement of labour from low paying 
industries to high paying industries, particularly in case of  similar type of workers. As a 
result of this inter-industry wages would tend to converge thus leading to a fall in growth 
of wages in the high paying industries and an increase in growth of wages in low paying 
industries. And we would expect to observe this more prominently in an economy that 
moves from a highly restrictive, regulated and distorted policy regime to one that is 
relatively more open, less regulated and less distorted. However, in our case, we observe 
that growth in wages for production workers have been moderate to high across all the 
industries in the pre-reforms period. But after massive reforms in trade and industrial 
policy, in the post reforms period we observe that growth in wages not only fall in 
majority of the industries relative to the pre-reforms period, but in fact it becomes 
negative in some cases. This shows that in spite of the reforms, no improvement took 
place in the inter-industry wage structure. In fact the inter-industry wage inequality has 
tended to grow. This clearly provides evidence that the labour market has not responded 
to the reforms in India thus highlighting the immobility of labour across industries. This 
is in line with the findings of Topalova (2004, 2006) that there is no evidence of any 
significant relocation of labour in a sample of Indian industries. Now, even though it 
might be difficult to identify an appropriate explanation for this, we would like to 
highlight three potential explanations. First, there exists considerable policy induced 
rigidities in the labour market, as highlighted in section 2, which stands as an impediment 
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to labour relocation between industries. Second, there might be substantial structural 
bottlenecks like lack in infrastructure or concentration of particular type of industries in 
particular geographical locations, which might also affect movement of labour between 
industries. Third, labour market non-adjustment may also be due to the existence of 
returns to industry-specific skills that cannot be transferred in the short- to medium- run 
[Kruegers & Summers (1987)], which is further complemented by a lack of easily 
accessible and affordable re-training opportunities for workers who want to move from 
one type of industry to another. Fourth, as pointed out by Ghose (1995), there is 
substitution of labour with capital resulting in a fall in growth of wages in the post-
reforms period across all industries. Fifth, skill biased technological change resulting in 
more favourable conditions for highly skilled (non-production) workers than for 
production workers resulting in lower growth in wages for production workers in the 
post-reforms period- a case which has attracted recent attention and some evidence has 
emerged [see Ramaswamy (2008), Hasan et al. (2007) and Sen (2009)].  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
This study explores the changing inter-industry wage structure in India by 
estimating the growth of average real wages for production workers by industry for 51 
manufacturing industries in the organised sector in India for the period 1973-2003. In 
order to estimate the growth rates, the study adopts a methodological framework that 
differs from other studies in that the time series properties of the concerned variables are 
closely considered in order to obtain meaningful estimates of growth that are both 
unbiased and (asymptotically) efficient. The study brings out the flaws of the 
conventional log-linear trend model to estimate growth using OLS principles by 
highlighting the importance of the dichotomy of whether the log of the variable is 
stationary or non-stationary. If the log of the variable under study is not stationary then 
the growth in the series would be purely the cumulative impact of a stochastic process 
rendering comparison between growth rates of different series meaningless. Our 
methodology obtains estimates of growth that are deterministic by accounting for 
potential structural break(s), and this is a significant contribution of our paper. In each 
industry, this amounts to identifying (deterministic) shock(s) to a wage growth process 
that is intrinsically stationary. 
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The estimates of growth of real wages per worker by industry highlight three 
important conclusions. First, the fact that the break dates occur at different time points for 
different industries bring to light the differential impact and speed of the reforms on 
different industries. Second, the fact that the first break occurs before 1991 provide 
evidence to the argument that the reforms started much before the much hyped drastic 
reforms of 1991; and, the second break occurs after 1991 for majority of the industries 
highlight that the effects of the radical reforms episode of 1991 was not felt immediately 
but with some lags, which were different for different industries. Third, and most 
importantly, the growth estimates of the real wage per worker show that the inter-industry 
wage structure in India has changed a lot in the period 1973-2003 and that it provides 
some evidence that the inter-industry wage differences have become more pronounced in 
the post-reforms period. The latter conclusion is particularly interesting as it implies that 
wages earned by similar type of workers but employed in different industries are 
different, which in turn has implications for the inter-industry wage inequality. This also 
suggests that there is immobility of labour between these sectors implying that the labour 
market in India has failed to respond in the wake of the reforms, may be due to rigidities 
in the labour market induced by policy or structural bottlenecks. 
Some immediate policy implications that follow from the above discussion are to 
carry out labour market reforms and remove structural bottlenecks in order to remove 
distortions that are causing rigidities that are serving as impediments to labour relocation. 
It might be appropriate to carry out an extensive study on how the labour legislation 
works in India and what are their effects on the dynamics of the labour market. In order 
to form conducive policy, it is important to identify the different channels through which 
the labour market outcomes are affected. For instance, in this study, our findings provide 
some evidence that similar type of workers have different rates of growth in wages in 
different industries. This finding supports the need to further explore the hypothesis that 
industry affiliation is an important determinant of wage. Such a case may arise because of 
returns to industry specific skills which cannot be transferred in the short- to medium- run 
or because of industry rents arising out of imperfect competition. If the former is true 
then a suitable policy recommendation would be to provide opportunities for appropriate 
re-training to workers that is easily accessible and affordable to workers who want to 
switch between industries. On the other hand, if the latter is true, then policies that would 
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increase competition should be adopted. That is why, it is important to consider the 
different channels through which the labour market is affected. This clearly brings out the 
need and scope for further research in this area. 
This paper presents an empirical justification to further explore the relationship 
between trade reforms and the inter-industry wage structure. In particular, it would be 
interesting to find out how the inter-industry wage structure would look like after 
controlling for individual worker characteristics and the relationship between trade 
reforms and the changing inter-industry wage structure, especially in the light of 
contrasting results of recent studies [see Dutta (2007) and Mishra & Kumar (2008)], 
which is our next research objective. The wage data used is this paper is average industry 
wage for production workers and hence has been used to show the differences in wages 
between average workers in different industries. 
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Table 1: Average Tariffs in different Sectors 
Tariffs 1990-91 1991-92 % Change 
Diversified 127.7 94.3 35.41 
Electrical Machinery 127.6 95.6 33.47 
Non-electrical Machinery 143.1 107.5 33.11 
Electronics 99.6 76 31.05 
Transport Equipment 120.6 93 29.67 
Source: Krishna & Mitra (1998) 
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Table 2: Non- Tariff barriers on imports in India in the 1980s and 1990s 
1987-88 Banned LP OGL Canalized NI Total 
In percent of HS Codes 33 18 13 7 29 100 
In percent of imports 16 23 16 27 18 100 
       
1992-93 Banned Restricted Free Canalized NS  
In percent of HS Codes 1 56 40 2 1 100 
In percent of imports 0 21 46 33 0 100 
       
1994-95 Banned Restricted Free Canalized NS  
In percent of HS Codes 0 43 55 2 0 100 
In percent of imports 0 20 55 25 0 100 
       
1997-98 Banned Restricted Free Canalized NS  
In percent of HS Codes 0 41 57 2 0 100 
In percent of imports 0 15 64 21 0 100 
Notes: LP = Limited Permissible, OGL = Open General License, NI = Not Identified, NS = Not Specified 
Source: Topalova (2004) 
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Table 3: Null and Alternate Hypotheses under the different Unit Root Tests 
 
Unit Root Test Null (H0) and Alternate (H1) Hypothesis 
ADF H0: Series contains a unit root, i.e. its is non-stationary H1: Series is trend-stationary 
Perron (1989) 
H0: Series contains a unit root with a once only exogenous change in the level 
(intercept) and an exogenous change in the drift parameter occurring at the 
break-point, TB. 
H1: Series is trend stationary with a change in both the level (intercept) and 
growth (slope) of the trend function occurring at the break-point, TB 
Lee and Strazicich 
(2003) 
H0: Series contains a unit root with once only endogenous changes in the level 
(intercept) at two break-points, TB1 and TB2 respectively, and two endogenous 
changes in the drift parameter occurring at the break-points, TB1 and TB2 
respectively. 
H1: Series is trend stationary with two changes in both the level (intercept) and 
growth (slope) of the trend function occurring at the endogenously determined 
break-points, TB1 and TB2 respectively. 
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Table 4: CAGR of Real Wages Per Worker 
2003,...,1973 51; 2,.., ,1 , ==++= titY itiiit εβα  
Yit is the natural logarithm of real wage per worker for industry i at time t, β estimate is required growth rate 
Industry Code CAGR ( iβˆ ) Industry Code CAGR ( iβˆ ) 
151 0.0278 269 0.0171 
152 0.0268 271 0.0248 
153 0.0258 272 0.0240 
154 0.0423 281 0.0391 
155 0.0251 289 0.0178 
160 0.0176 291 0.0202 
171 0.0076 292 0.0230 
172 0.0104 293 0.0163 
173 0.0168 300 0.0076 
181 0.0125 311 0.0530 
182 0.0161 312 -0.0111 
191 0.0106 313 0.0113 
192 -0.0044 314 0.0120 
201 0.0126 319 0.0008 
202 0.0154 321 0.0388 
210 0.0171 323 0.0018 
221 0.0334 331 0.0250 
222 0.0155 332 0.0244 
231 0.0217 333 0.0278 
232 0.0289 341 0.0368 
241 0.0249 342 0.0155 
242 0.0106 351 0.0120 
251 0.0151 352 0.0141 
252 0.0198 359 0.0245 
261 0.0311 361 0.0273 
  369 0.0129 
Source: Author's Calculations based on ASI Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
Table 5: ADF Test and CAGR & AAGR of Real Wages Per Worker 
ADF Test: 
H0: There is a unit root i.e the series is non-stationary or I(1) 
H1: There is no unit root i.e the series is trend-stationary or I(0) 
itiititiiit YAAGRtYCAGR εβεβα +=∆++= :;: ; where Yit is the natural log of real wage per 
worker for industry i = 1-51 at time t = 1973-2003, β estimate is the required growth rate 
Industry 
Code ADF test CAGR AAGR 
Industry 
Code ADF test CAGR AAGR 
151 NS 0.0278 0.0179 269 NS 0.0171 0.0142 
152 NS 0.0268 0.0203 271 TS*** 0.0248 0.0259 
153 TS** 0.0258 0.0203 272 NS 0.0240 0.0253 
154 NS 0.0423 0.0204 281 TS** 0.0391 0.0365 
155 NS 0.0251 0.0188 289 NS 0.0178 0.0129 
160 NS 0.0176 0.0109 291 NS 0.0202 0.0141 
171 NS 0.0076 0.0037 292 NS 0.0230 0.0201 
172 NS 0.0104 0.0059 293 TS* 0.0163 0.0125 
173 NS 0.0168 0.0091 300 TS** 0.0076 0.0115 
181 TS*** 0.0125 0.0082 311 TS* 0.0530 0.0521 
182 TS** 0.0161 0.0243 312 NS -0.0111 -0.0133 
191 NS 0.0106 0.0065 313 NS 0.0113 0.008 
192 TS** -0.0044 -0.0049 314 NS 0.0120 0.0112 
201 NS 0.0126 0.0092 319 NS 0.0008 0.0109 
202 TS*** 0.0154 0.011 321 TS*** 0.0388 0.0287 
210 NS 0.0171 0.0122 323 TS** 0.0018 0.0036 
221 TS** 0.0334 0.0292 331 NS 0.0250 0.0161 
222 NS 0.0155 0.0076 332 TS** 0.0244 0.0175 
231 TS*** 0.0217 0.0169 333 TS*** 0.0278 0.0257 
232 NS 0.0289 0.0211 341 TS*** 0.0368 0.0337 
241 NS 0.0249 0.0241 342 TS** 0.0155 0.0122 
242 NS 0.0106 0.0058 351 NS 0.0120 0.0094 
251 NS 0.0151 0.0109 352 NS 0.0141 0.0112 
252 NS 0.0198 0.0126 359 NS 0.0245 0.0233 
261 TS** 0.0311 0.0217 361 TS* 0.0273 0.0278 
    369 TS* 0.0129 0.0129 
Total Number of TS series: 21 
Notes:        
1. NS and TS stands for Non-stationary and Trend-stationary respectively. 
2. In a trend stationary series, the star stands for the statistical level of significance at which the Null 
Hypothesis that the series contains a unit root is rejected; ***, **, * denotes significance levels of 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
3. When a series is NS, then the CAGR is not a valid representation of the true growth rate of the series. 
We nevertheless report it for the sake of comparison and completeness. 
4. When a series is TS i.e I(0) then its first difference is also I(0). Hence we can also estimate the AAGR 
of the series. However AAGR is subject to outlier bias, see section 2.4 
Source: Author's Calculations based on ASI Data    
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Table 6: Growth rates of real wages per worker 
  Top Five Bottom Five 
  Industry Growth Rate Industry Growth Rate 
  311 0.052976 312 -0.0133 
  281 0.039052 192 -0.00442 
  321 0.038787 323 0.00181 
  341 0.036824 171 0.0037 
  221 0.033411 242 0.0058 
Average (all) 0.016827 
Median (all) 0.015438 
SD (all) 0.011529 
Notes 
1. Growth rates are CAGR or AAGR depending on stationarity properties of 
the series 
2. For trend-stationary series, CAGR is identical to AAGR 
Source: Author's calculations based on ASI data 
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Table 7: Unit Root Tests with Break(s) for natural log of real wages per worker 
Industry Code Perron Lee-Strazicich 
 Result (Exogenous Break at 1991) Result Break Dates 
151 NS TS** 1985 1997 
152 TS*** TS*** 1983 1989 
153 TS*** TS*** 1983 1990 
154 NS TS*** 1987 1999 
155 TS*** TS*** 1985 1996 
160 NS TS*** 1983 1990 
171 NS TS*** 1987 2000 
172 TS**^ TS*** 1984 1992 
173 NS TS*** 1984 2000 
181 NS TS*** 1983 1986 
182 NS TS** 1983 1996 
191 TS* TS*** 1986 1995 
192 NS TS* 1983 1994 
201 TS*** TS*** 1987 2000 
202 TS* TS* 1986 1998 
210 TS* TS** 1985 1997 
221 TS*** TS*** 1985 1995 
222 TS*** TS*** 1986 1998 
231 NS TS*** 1984 2000 
232 TS**^ TS*** 1988 2000 
241 TS**^ TS*** 1983 1994 
242 TS*** TS*** 1993 1996 
251 NS TS*** 1991 2000 
252 TS* TS*** 1987 2000 
261 TS*** TS*** 1985 1998 
269 NS TS*** 1983 1997 
271 NS TS*** 1986 1995 
272 NS TS*** 1992 1999 
281 NS TS* 1984 1997 
289 NS TS*** 1983 1989 
291 NS TS*** 1986 2000 
292 TS*** TS*** 1989 2000 
293 TS* TS*** 1990 1997 
300 NS NS 1990 2000 
311 NS NS 1987 1996 
312 NS TS*** 1983 1999 
313 NS TS* 1984 2000 
314 NS TS*** 1983 1986 
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319 NS TS*** 1983 1988 
321 NS TS*** 1987 2000 
323 TS* TS*** 1986 1989 
331 TS** TS*** 1988 2000 
332 NS TS*** 1986 1999 
333 NS TS*** 1992 2000 
341 NS TS*** 1986 1997 
342 NS TS*** 1984 1994 
351 NS TS*** 1984 1987 
352 TS* TS*** 1984 1999 
359 TS*** TS*** 1989 2000 
361 TS*** TS*** 1983 1986 
369 TS*** TS** 1983 1991 
Total TS Series 23 49 
Notes: 
1. NS and TS stands for Non-stationary and Trend-stationary respectively. 
2. In a trend stationary series, the star stands for the statistical level of significance at which the Null 
Hypothesis that the series contains a unit root is rejected; ***, **^, **, * denotes significance levels of 
1%, 2.5%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
3. For all the tests, the model that allows break(s) in both level(s) and slope(s) is considered. This 
corresponds to Perron (1989) Model C and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) Model CC. We also tried a 
model that allowed only level breaks, analogous to Perron’s (1989) original Model A, but in majority of 
the cases, the t-statistics on estimated coefficients for Model C are significant at conventional levels of 
significance and hence we just present the results for Model C. 
4. For compactness, we just report the final result of the concerned unit root test with the break dates. But 
the detailed output files are available from the authors upon request. 
5. The tests are conducted in GAUSS and uses critical values as reported in Perron (1989) and Lee and 
Strazicich (2003). We gratefully acknowledge Junsoo Lee for making the GAUSS codes used in Lee and 
Strazicich (2003) and the codes for the Perron (1989) tests freely available in his website: 
http://cba.ua.edu/~jlee/gauss . We had to slightly modify these codes for our purpose and had to fix a bug 
in the code for the Perron test. These codes are available from the authors upon request.  
6. In each test, we use lags of the dependent variable to correct for any serial correlation, and the optimal 
lag length (k) is determined by following the general-to-specific approach used by Perron (1989) and 
suggested by Ng and Perron (1997, 2001). 
7. In order to eliminate end-points, we choose a ‘trimming region’ to search for the possible break(s) over 
the time interval [0.1T, 0.9T].  
Source: Author’s calculations based on ASI data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
Table 8: Comparison of ADF test and Perron's test (with exogenous break at 1991) 
results 
  Different conclusions Same conclusions  
Industry Codes 
that are: 
NS (ADF) and TS 
(Perron) 
TS (ADF) and NS 
(Perron) 
NS (ADF) and NS 
(Perron) 
TS (ADF) and 
TS (ADF) 
  152 181 151 153 
  155 182 154 202 
  172 192 160 221 
  191 231 171 261 
  201 271 173 293 
  210 281 251 323 
  222 300 269 361 
  232 311 272 369 
  241 321 289   
  242 332 291   
  252 333 312   
  292 341 313   
  331 342 314   
  352   319   
  359   351   
Total No. of 
series 15 13 15 8 
Notes: 
1. NS and TS stand for non-stationary and trend-stationary. 
2. The variable in question here is the natural log of real wages per worker 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ASI data 
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Table 9: Growth rate estimates of real wage per worker for the 15 industries 
presented in column 2, Table 7 
 Sub-periods Whole Period 
Industry Codes 1973-1991 1992-2003 1973-2003 
152 0.038592 0.002494 0.026797 
155 0.033969 0.002858 0.025124 
172 0.024402 -0.015879 0.010441 
191 0.02061 -0.016017 0.010604 
201 0.025356 -0.008507 0.01258 
210 0.026515 -0.003972 0.017123 
222 0.027587 -0.020612 0.015451 
232 0.024062 0.033559 0.028921 
241 0.034361 0.016002 0.024872 
242 0.030942 -0.022681 0.010637 
252 0.035708 -0.003821 0.019789 
292 0.032511 0.001515 0.02298 
331 0.039488 -0.025911 0.024992 
352 0.031766 -0.017071 0.014072 
359 0.036106 0.015144 0.024492 
Mean 0.030798 -0.004193 0.019258 
Median 0.031766 -0.003972 0.019789 
SD 0.005754 0.016643 0.006590 
Notes: 
1. The sub-period growth rates (CAGR) are estimated by using dummy variables, as follows, 
itiiiiit tDtDDDY εββαα ++++= 22112211 , where Yit is the natural log of real wage per worker 
for industry i = 1, 2, ..., 15 at t = 1973,..., 2003; Dj (j = 1, 2) is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 
in the j-th sub-period and 0 otherwise. βj (j=1, 2) estimate is the required growth rate for the j-th sub-
period. 
2. The sub-period growth rates are unbiased and asymptotically efficient. 
3. We also report the whole period growth rates (CAGR) for the sake of completeness even though these 
estimates are not asymptotically efficient. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ASI data 
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Table 10: Growth rate estimates of real wage per worker for selected industries 
(see note 1) 
 Breakpoints Growth Rates Whole Period 
Industry Codes TB1 TB2 1973 – TB1 (TB1+1)- TB2 (TB2+1)- 2003 1973-2003 
181 1983 1986 0.005606 0.04452 0.011998 0.012503 
314 1983 1986 0.034634 0.049705 -0.010284 0.011974 
361 1983 1986 0.066336 0.15503 0.009752 0.027349 
152 1983 1989 0.044448 0.036976 0.003201 0.026797 
289 1983 1989 0.036713 0.032641 -0.007303 0.017813 
153 1983 1990 0.039007 0.040074 0.011657 0.025773 
160 1983 1990 0.011582 0.018492 0.002624 0.017587 
192 1983 1994 0.009482 -0.018279 -0.013889 -0.004423 
241 1983 1994 0.042959 0.017992 0.018232 0.024872 
173 1984 2000 0.031211 0.004873 -0.006961 0.016815 
231 1984 2000 0.021952 0.01657 -0.051679 0.021742 
313 1984 2000 0.034733 -0.003605 -0.043497 0.011294 
151 1985 1997 0.043182 0.01701 0.020981 0.027766 
210 1985 1997 0.023993 0.017762 0.007123 0.017123 
191 1986 1995 0.020702 0.018226 -0.014603 0.010604 
271 1986 1995 0.022662 0.026887 0.027476 0.024824 
202 1986 1998 0.023406 -0.000801 -0.011877 0.015438 
222 1986 1998 0.026039 0.00948 0.025044 0.015451 
171 1987 2000 0.020258 -0.011056 -0.019219 0.007635 
201 1987 2000 0.020167 -0.014046 0.019112 0.01258 
252 1987 2000 0.038443 -0.000307 -0.008125 0.019789 
321 1987 2000 0.046817 0.021664 -0.008163 0.038787 
232 1988 2000 0.016444 0.033577 -0.02363 0.028921 
331 1988 2000 0.033983 -0.008446 -0.048186 0.024992 
292 1989 2000 0.03238 0.00624 0.007729 0.02298 
359 1989 2000 0.035093 -0.00086 0.036682 0.024492 
Notes: 
1. This table present the growth rate estimates of real wage per worker for only those industries, the break 
dates (based on the LM test results in Table 6) for which are identical to that of at least one other industry. 
2. The sub-period growth rates (CAGR) are estimated by using dummy variables, as follows, 
itiiiiiiit DtDtDDDDY εβββααα ++++++= 332211332211 , where Yit is the natural log of real 
wage per worker for industry i = 1, 2, ..., 49  (we report results for 25 industries only- see explanation in 
note 1) at t = 1973,..., 2003; Dj (j = 1, 2, 3) is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 in the j-th sub-
period and 0 otherwise. βj (j=1, 2, 3) estimate is the required growth rate (CAGR) for the j-th sub-period. 
3. The sub-period growth rates are unbiased and asymptotically efficient- we just report 25 of them here. 
4. We also report the whole period growth rates (CAGR) for the sake of completeness even though these 
estimates are not asymptotically efficient. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ASI data 
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Figure 1: Fall in average nominal tariff rates and its standard deviation, 1987-2001 
 
Source: Topalova (2004) 
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 Appendix Table1: National Industrial Classification 1998 at three digit level of industry aggregation, India 
NIC-98 
Code Industry Description 
151 Production, processing and preserving of meat, fish, fruits, veg., oils and fats 
152 Manufacture of dairy product 
153 Manufacture of grain mills products, starches and strach produtcs and prepared animal feeds 
154 Manufacture of other food products 
155 Manufacture of beverages 
160 Manufacture of tobacco products 
171 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 
172 Manufacture of other textiles 
173 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 
181 Manufacturing of wearing apparel, except for fur apparel 
182 Dressing and dyeing of fur, manufacture of articles of fur 
191 Tanning and dressing of leather, manufacture of luggage hand bags, saddlery & harness 
192 Manufacture of footwear 
201 Saw milling and planing of wood 
202 Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials 
210 Manufacture of paper and paper product 
221 Publishing 
222 Printing and service activities related to printing 
231 Manufacture of coke oven products 
232 Manufactured refined petroleum products 
241 Manufacture of basic chemicals 
242 Manufacture of other chemical products 
243 Manufacture of man-made fibres 
251 Manufacture of rubber products 
252 Manufacture of plastic products 
261 Manufacture of glass and glass products 
269 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c 
271 Manufacture of basic iron and steel 
272 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
273 Casting of metals 
281 Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs and steam generators 
289 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products, metal working service activities 
291 Manufacture of general purpose machinery 
292 Manufacture of special purpose machinery 
293 Manufacture of domestic appliances, n.e.c 
300 Manufacture of office, accounting and computer machinery 
311 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 
312 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 
313 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 
314 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 
315 Manufacture of electric lamps and lighting equipment 
319 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c 
321 Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 
322 Manufacture og TV and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy 
323 Manufacture of TV and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus, and associated goods 
331 Manufacture of medical appliances and instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and  other purposes except optical instruments 
46 
332 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 
333 Manufacture of watches and clocks 
341 Manufacture of motor vehicles 
342 Manufacture of bodies for motor vehicles, trailer and semi trailers 
351 Building and repair of ships and boats 
352 Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rollick stock 
353 Manufacture of air craft and space craft 
359 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c. 
361 Manufacture of furniture 
369 Manufacturing n.e.c 
Source:National Industrial Classification, 1998, CSO, MOSPI, Govt. of India 
 
